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Partiality and Disclosure in Supreme Court
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ABSTRACT
This Essay begins by identifying the various kinds of partiality the Justices of the
Supreme Court can have in the cases they decide. Although there is widespread
recognition of the influence these biases might have, for the most part the Justices
continue to write opinions as if they (and other judges) were entirely disinterested. This
practice is often thought to be justified as a source of judicial legitimacy, but there are a
number of reasons to doubt that a pretense of impersonality is actually important for
maintaining respect for the Court. Consequently, the possibility has to be considered that
the Justices should routinely acknowledge their interests. This Essay, however, assesses
some exceptional categories of cases where the Justices have addressed the issue of
partiality and concludes that judicial self-interest prevents candid or realistic appraisals
of possible bias.
INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, I address the question of whether the Justices of the Supreme Court
(and perhaps, by extension, other judges) should routinely acknowledge and evaluate
their interests in the cases they are deciding. This kind of attention to possible bias would
certainly constitute a fundamental change, as the established style, with few exceptions,
is a firmly impersonal focus on the legal merits of the dispute. Though it may seem odd
in an age where the tenets of legal realism are widely accepted, most observers take this
general pattern for granted and seem satisfied with it. Appreciation for the various forms
that partiality can take has grown considerably in modern times, but the judicial practice
of maintaining silence on this issue has largely remained unchanged. In a world where
the Justices cannot be idealized as impersonal expositors of the law, the traditional reason
for this silence is no longer persuasive. Nevertheless, as I intend to show, the very fact
that judges have human frailties counsels against extensive self-examination in judicial
opinions.
I. SILENCE ABOUT PARTIALITY AS A SOURCE OF RESPECT FOR THE JUDICIARY
A useful place to start thinking about partiality on the Supreme Court is the case
that today is commonly credited with establishing the Court’s preeminent role as legal
arbiter. Despite Marbury v. Madison’s1 canonical status, it is often observed that Chief
* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. Allison Darby, Marie
Elizabeth Nakagawa, and Sara Radke provided the author with useful research assistance.
1
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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Justice John Marshall was not exactly impartial when he authored that decision.2 Indeed,
Marbury provides a kind of road map of the various aspects of judicial bias.3 Marshall
was partial in the backward-looking sense that his own behavior helped give rise to the
case. He was partial in the forward-looking sense that he would be affected by the
outcome of the case. And he was biased both personally and, as a member of the
judiciary, institutionally.
Marshall’s behavior had directly created the circumstances that led to the lawsuit.
Recall that while Secretary of State in the Adams Administration, Marshall himself
sealed the commission that became the subject of Marbury’s lawsuit, and Marshall’s
brother was the person who failed to deliver the sealed document.4 These facts may help
to explain another frequently noted feature of Marbury: Despite the ultimate holding that
the Court was without jurisdiction to decide the case, the Court’s opinion declares the
appointment to have been complete upon sealing.5 Marshall, that is, went out of his way
to find his own behavior and that of his brother to have been legally harmless. In the
decision that today is taken to be the fountainhead of the Supreme Court’s central role in
enforcing our fundamental law no mention is made of the Chief Justice’s part in the
transactions that gave rise to the case.
Partiality of a different kind might also help to explain why Marshall’s famous
opinion purports to decide that the Secretary of State would have been subject to a
judicial order mandating delivery of the commission (if only the Court had had
jurisdiction).6 Needless to say, this determination had large implications for the power of
federal courts, dominated by members of Marshall’s political party, to control executive
officers who were members of the rival party. In short, the dictum concerning sovereign
immunity increased Marshall’s power and that of his political allies in potentially
concrete and important ways. Marbury is silent about this rather delicate matter,7 as if the
fact that the outcome of a case would benefit the Justices both personally and as members
of the judicial branch was too crass even to occur to them or too unworthy to merit
comment.
Along with black robes, elevated seating, and arcane language, this kind of silence
is one of the “ritual[s] of solemn detachment” that we take for granted.8 Indeed, it is
normal for judges not to mention their very real interests in the cases they decide. These
interests are noticed by journalists, political scientists, and other observers, but for the
most part they are ignored in judicial opinions.
Silence is the rule even when a litigant raises the issue of partiality in a recusal
petition. Such petitions are referred to the Justice whose fairness is being questioned, so
the Court never issues decisions, let alone explanations, on such matters. The practice,

2

See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008 47 (2009).
For a useful discussion of the nature of impartiality, see Andreas Schedler, Arguing and Observing:
Internal and External Critiques of Judicial Impartiality, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 245 (2004); see also William
Lucy, The Possibility of Impartiality, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (2005).
4
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 144 (2004).
5
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 151.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Schedler, supra note 3, at 257.
3
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with two notable exceptions9 has been for the Justice to decide without any opinion
whether recusal is appropriate.10
When the possibility of bias is institutional as well as individualized, the practice of
silence is just as firmly entrenched. An egregious illustration is Stump v. Sparkman,11 a
1978 decision in which the Court held that state judges are immune from monetary
liability even for intentional or malicious violations of constitutional rights.12 In an
opinion sharply at odds with trends in the case law concerning executive and legislative
immunity, the Court mentioned partiality only as a justification for absolute judicial
immunity. Twice the Justices asserted that it is “a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of Justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”13 It is to be expected, of course, that
the Justices would have special concern and respect for the functions performed by other
jurists. Moreover, the logic of Stump, if applied to federal judges, would shield the
Justices and their colleagues on the federal bench from financial liability in civil rights
cases. This, however, was not the kind of “personal consequence” that the Justices
thought worth discussing.14
Perhaps the Justices believe that the mystique of impersonality would be threatened
if they were to acknowledge the issue of judicial bias even in the limited number of cases
where, as in Stump, the interest of judges in the outcome is fairly direct, tangible, and
obvious. However this may be, it must be admitted that, if routinely extended to cases
where a Justice’s interest is more remote, candid acknowledgement of his stake might
plausibly be thought to undermine the judicial role. It is not unreasonable to be
concerned, as jurists and lawyers undoubtedly are, at the prospect of the Justices
constantly writing about themselves and their possible biases.
As understandable as this concern is, it leads to the perverse conclusion that silence
about partiality is more important as a source of institutional strength to the extent that
the Justices are in fact often interested in case outcomes. And, whether the Justices’
interests reside in the background of the case or in its outcome, the existence of those
interests will be very common indeed. The Justices of the Supreme Court often are a part
of the background of cases for the simple reason that they are powerful people both
before and after their elevation to the Court. For instance, while a senator, Hugo Black
helped to draft the Fair Labor Standards Act, the constitutionality of which he later voted

9

See infra text accompanying notes 113–127.
Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN.
L. REV. 531, 575–76 (2005).
11
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). One Justice did later acknowledge the appearance of selfdealing. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 528 n.* (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that special immunity rules for judges and others operating as a part of the
judicial machinery may be seen as an example of judges treating nonjudicial officials as “lesser breeds
without the law”).
12
Unless the judge acts “in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 357 (quoting
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871)).
13
Id. at 355, 363 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347, 351–52).
14
Id. at 355. But see Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., memorandum opinion) (denying
motion to recuse himself).
10
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on while a Justice.15 While a member of the Justice Department, William Rehnquist
testified before Congress on a case that he later helped the Court to decide.16
More broadly, as members of the Court, the Justices help to shape many of the
social norms and practices that are later the subject of adjudication. During the so-called
federalism revival, for instance, the Court issued many opinions seeking to strengthen
state sovereignty, conceived of as dignitary status, when the Court itself had for decades
been undermining that dignitary status.17 Arguably, at least, the Justices had helped to
create the need for the federalism revival that they eventually initiated. In Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Court emphasized the wisdom of allowing the political branches to cope,
at least for a while, with the volatile issue of assisted suicide.18 It did so against the
background of having decided Roe v. Wade in a way that cut off political debate and
reform; thus, as was surely known by the Justices who decided Glucksberg, severely
aggravating social tensions and possibly reducing access to abortion.19 The Justices’
handling of the abortion issue helped to create the social context against which the Court
decided to allow continued political responsibility for the assisted suicide issue.
If institutional interests are taken into account, the web of causality—and
partiality—is much wider. In Brown v. Board of Education,20 the Court began a
prolonged and difficult attack on a system of racial segregation that predecessor Justices
in Plessy v. Ferguson21 had helped to legitimize. Was the judiciary’s institutional
responsibility for Jim Crow one reason for the Warren Court’s idealistic campaign? The
same kind of question arises from the Court’s treatment of the commerce power. Was the
post-1937 approval of vast expansions of federal regulatory power influenced, not simply
by a change in membership, but by a sense of institutional responsibility for the earlier
Court’s risky and much-criticized effort to stem the New Deal? And was the Rehnquist
Court’s eventual effort to define limits to the commerce power in part a reaction to the
widespread belief, which the post-1937 Court had done much to create, that there are no
limits to the commerce power?
The Justices are also often a part of the cases they decide in the sense that the
outcomes will affect them personally. This is so because they live in the society that their
decisions do so much to shape. They may have children or grandchildren who attend
public schools that, because of Establishment Clause decisions, are bare of religious
observances. A relative or a friend may be a homosexual whose life has been changed by
the privacy decisions. Some of the Justices may hope that at some point assisted suicide
might be an option for themselves or a relative.
Of course, as realists never tire of pointing out, the consequences of case outcomes
involve more subtle or remote interests as well. A decision may advantage the political
party responsible for the Justice’s elevation to the Court or a cause that has long

15

Laird, 409 U.S. at 831.
Frost, supra note 10, at 545–46.
17
See Robert F. Nagel, William Rehnquist and the American Concept of Sovereignty (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author).
18
521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
19
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,
63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985).
20
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16
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interested the Justice. It may implement some moral precept favored by the Justice’s
religion. Patterns of decision making may lead to fame or obloquy or obscurity.
When, as in Marbury, the judicial interest in the case is both retroactive (in the
sense that a Justice or the Court as a whole helped to shape the transaction giving rise to
the case) and prospective (in the sense that the Justices or their colleagues will be
affected by the outcome), the Court can effectively become the real party in interest.
Those who praise Marbury as an act of judicial statesmanship do not have in mind the
plaintiff, who did not get his commission, nor the defendant, who did not have to deliver
it. They have in mind that the Court greatly enhanced the power of federal courts under
circumstances unlikely to arouse political opposition. This may well have been
profoundly good for the country, but this possibility does not diminish the fact that it was
also profoundly good for the members of the Court. The Court—its institutional role, its
prestige and power—is what Marbury is about.
A similar substitution of the Court for the nominal party in interest can be seen in
the school desegregation cases. Consider the many cases from across the country in
which federal courts held school districts to be in violation of the Constitution because
they had not achieved adequate levels of racial balance. As much attention as this record
of struggle has received, not everyone fully recognizes that the district court orders,
which were based on standards set by the Supreme Court, were a central aspect of the
transactions being adjudicated. The reasonableness and feasibility of these orders and
standards were what was at issue.22 Moreover, the institutional prestige of the Justices
and their colleagues, not to mention their place in history, would be diminished if the
outcome of the lawsuit were to appear to reward resistance to the judiciary’s part in the
dispute. It is not too much to say that in deciding whether the actions of the defendants
violated the Equal Protection Clause the Justices paid as much attention to state officials’
attitudes towards federal judicial authority as to the educational interests of the plaintiff
class.23
As large a stake in a case as the Justices may have, a thorough recognition of the
kinds of interests that they have leads more often to passivity or resignation than to
disapproval.24 This is because, while the ideal of impartiality is unachievable, the task of
judging must go on. It is an understandable response to this dilemma to turn from the task
of assuring impartiality to the task of maintaining the ideal—or myth or mystique—of
impartiality. If judging is necessary and if some partiality in judging is unavoidable, then
what seems to matter is convincing the members of the polity that the Justices are
impartial or at least sufficiently impartial. This is done through the various rituals of
impartiality, including (as we have seen) publishing opinions that treat the issue of
partiality as if it does not exist or, at least, is not worth discussion.
However, given all the ways that the Justices are a part of the cases they decide, the
rituals of impartiality—especially the aloof posture struck by the Justices in their
opinions—seem rather insubstantial. In fact, it may be that poses like elevated seating
and silence about partiality serve mainly to reassure the Justices themselves and some
others who are acculturated into the world of lawyering. Large segments of the public
22

See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1958).
Indeed, in Cooper, the Justices as much as acknowledged that their insistence on immediate compliance
with the lower court order would harm students’ education. Id. at 15.
24
See generally, POWE, supra note 2, at 350.
23
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may take the hard-nosed view that the Justices are naturally interested in the cases they
decide just as large segments believe the Justices are influenced by political
considerations.25 Although the public seems to approve of legalistic values in judicial
decision making, the evidence that legalistic opinion writing legitimates the judiciary is
surprisingly scant.26 If fidelity to precedent, for instance, does not especially affect
attitudes towards judges, how much less effect would a fictive pose of stolid impartiality
have?
Even if the ritual of silence is not especially effective in establishing the legitimacy
of the Court’s decisions, it does not necessarily follow that the Justices, or other judges,
are viewed as unfair or lawless. Belief in judicial impartiality, like respect for courts in
general, may come from elsewhere. One obvious source is generalized beliefs about the
importance to the political system of law and the judicial function.27 An alternative
source lies in judicial procedures, in the traditions and rules that assure some
approximation of equal opportunity for argument.28 The opportunity for oral argument
and briefing, for instance, provides a commonsensical reason to believe that judicial
partiality is being contained. True, arguments can be undervalued or ignored, but it is
surely plausible to think that the right to present arguments at least makes fair
consideration possible.
Another plausible protection arises from assurances (frequently given during
confirmation hearings and in other public settings) that the Justices will earnestly try to
resist the influence of personal considerations. These assurances are, obviously, selfserving and for a number of reasons not entirely dependable. But everyone has
experience with analogous efforts at self-control. The events of everyday life, like
umpiring a Little League game or settling a neighborhood dispute, provide some basis to
believe that good-faith efforts at impartiality are possible and have some effect.29
If factors like fair procedures and personal self-control are the real bases for public
satisfaction about judicial impartiality, the ritual of silence might be expendable. There is
little reason to pretend that the Justices do not have interests in the cases they decide if
most people already realize that they do and believe that there are workable methods for
keeping their partiality within acceptable limits. Indeed, in cases where the possibility of
bias is strong and evident, like Stump, acknowledgement might be more re-assuring than
silence.30 Acknowledgement would at least indicate a degree of self-awareness. Even if
the ritual of silence were broken in more routine instances of possible partiality, the
frequency with which the issue would have to be addressed might not be a problem.
References to possible bias could, perhaps, become an ordinary part of judicial decisions
and be largely taken for granted.
25

John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular Expectations
Regarding the Factors That Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 181, 190 (2001).
26
See, e.g., James R. Zink, James F. Spriggs II, & John T. Scott, Courting the Public: The Influence of
Decision Attributes on Individuals’ Views of Court Opinions, 71 J. POL. 909 (2009).
27
See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 658 (1992).
28
Frost, supra note 10, at 559–60; VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS 13 (2003).
29
For an argument that ordinary thought provides a rich understanding of impartiality, see generally Lucy,
supra note 3.
30
Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 696–97 (2005).

121

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

In short, in this age of realism the ritual of silence may no longer be credible or
necessary. However, the consequences of breaking with the general pattern of silence
about partiality would depend on the manner in which the Justices chose to discuss their
own interests in the cases they decide. Fortunately this need not be entirely a matter of
conjecture, since there are specific categories of cases where the ritual of silence has not
been observed. One of these categories involves cases where a judge is charged with
being so biased as to deny due process of law, and a second involves cases where the
exercise of freedom of speech is alleged to have intimidated a judge. As demonstrated in
the next Part, in these two types of cases the Justices portray judges as strong and
impersonal. The third category of cases, which I discuss in Part III, involves the question
of whether judges have made a legal error in a prior case. In these cases the Justices paint
judges in highly personal, even heroic, tones. There have been only two decisions in
which a Justice explained his recusal decision, but these confirm the conclusions that
emerge from the other three categories of cases and will be discussed in the final section.
II. IMPERSONALITY AS A SIGN OF THE JUSTICES’ CONFIDENCE
In this Part, I shall examine, first, cases in which the Justices determine whether a
judge’s possible bias towards a litigant violates due process and, second, cases in which
the Justices decide whether speech has so intimidated a judge as to be unprotected by free
speech principles. These two areas of the law are, of course, quite different, but in both
the Justices depict judges (and by inference the Justices themselves) as being capable of
enormous self-discipline. Descriptions of judges as strong and impersonal occur even
when the Justices are attempting a psychologically realistic assessment. They occur
despite the fact that, as the free speech cases show, the Justices are certainly able to
provide perceptive descriptions of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of individuals who
are not jurists.
A. The Possibility of Judicial Bias Against a Litigant
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court expanded the rather narrow range
of cases where the partiality of a judge violates the Due Process Clause.31 The lower
court noted that the Constitution required recusal when a judge has a “direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest” in a case.32 The Supreme Court in Caperton held that:
[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable
perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had
a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the
case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the
case was pending or imminent.33
Caperton widens the constitutional standard for identifying partiality in that a political
contribution benefits the campaigning judge indirectly and impersonally (by aiding in his
re-election to a public office, as opposed to providing funds for his personal use). This
31

129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
Capterton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 295 (W. Va. 2008).
33
Id. at 2263–64.
32
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move from the “direct, personal, substantial” standard appears to support the possibility
that the Justices can discuss both judicial psychology and public perception in realistic
terms.34 Certainly there can be “a serious risk of actual bias” in many circumstances other
than ones involving a “direct, personal, . . . pecuniary interest.”35
It might be doubted that Caperton demonstrates any willingness or capacity to
discuss the Justices’ own partiality in realistic terms, since neither they nor their
colleagues on the federal bench are elected to office. However, the Court’s discussion of
judicial bias bears on the Justices themselves because of the professional and institutional
identification to be expected among jurists. In this sense, whenever the Court discusses
bias in judging, it is discussing its own role as well. Moreover, the approach taken in
Caperton has some potential for application to federal judges. Confirmation hearings,
after all, have many of the trappings of a campaign. If a political advisor, who had helped
to “direct” a judicial nominee by devising a strategy for responding to senators’
questions, were a party before that individual after confirmation, the logic of Caperton
might raise a question of partiality. So might a lawsuit involving an interest group that
had taken out advertisements intended to influence public attitudes and senatorial votes.
The analogy between electoral campaigns and confirmation hearings is supported
by Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent, which emphasizes the potential expansion of the
concept of bias inherent in the majority opinion.36 The long list of questions, that he
asserts are opened up by the majority opinion, includes some that could apply to the
federal nomination and confirmation process. He asks, for example, “Does a debt of
gratitude for endorsements by newspapers, interest groups, politicians, or celebrities also
give rise to a constitutionally unacceptable probability of bias?”37
In any event, Caperton can usefully be examined for indications about how the
Justices might discuss their own partiality. Although on the one hand, Caperton
represents an effort to move consideration of judicial bias to a more realistic level, on the
other, it rests firmly on an idealized view of the judge and the judge’s capacities. The
majority opinion quotes this passage from Tumey v. Ohio:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of
law.38
The Court refers to this sentence no less than four times.39 This repeated reliance is
incongruous in an opinion that aims at some degree of realism. Notice that the Tumey
standard begins by referring to “[e]very procedure which would offer a possible
34

See id. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)) (referencing the “realistic appraisal
of psychological tendencies and human weakness”).
35
See generally Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (noting that lower court judges issued citation for
and found defendant guilty of contempt for statements made about a political matter involving the judges).
36
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
37
Id. at 2270. But, for the most part, even where the questions could have relevance outside the electoral
context, Roberts has in mind candidates and elected judges. Id. at 2269–72.
38
Id. at 2260 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
39
Id. at 2260, 2261, 2264, 2265.
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temptation.”40 And the procedure need only offer a temptation to “the average man as a
judge.”41 A temptation to do what? “[N]ot to hold the balance nice, clear, and true.”42 In
other words, the existence of any temptation that might possibly cause an average judge
to depart even slightly from a precise legal balance violates due process of law. Because
the existence of almost any personal incentive might meet this test and thus violate the
Due Process Clause, the paradoxical effect of the passage is to idealize judges and
judging. The standard for unconstitutional partiality can be phrased in such exacting
terms only because of the hidden assumption that the average judge will seldom be
tempted to depart from holding the balance “nice, clear and true.” Otherwise, virtually
any judicial decision might be subject to challenge for partiality.
The Court’s assumption that judges are usually impervious to the temptations of
partiality emerges clearly when the opinion cites to In re Murchison,43 a decision finding
unconstitutional partiality when a judge served as a “one-man grand jury” and then tried
the same defendant he had indicted. Murchison is quoted for the brave proposition that
“no man can be a judge in his own case.”44 Further, “no man is permitted to try cases
where he has an interest in the outcome,” and “a judge . . . [must be] . . . wholly
disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused.”45 Judges, presumably
average judges, are capable of being—and are expected to be—wholly disinterested in
the outcome of the cases they try.
The conceit that judges can be wholly disinterested is repeated in Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania,46 another case relied on by the Caperton Court. Mayberry, like Caperton,
attempted to inject a note of realism into evaluations of judicial partiality. The trial judge
in Mayberry had been subjected to a series of colorful insults from a pro se criminal
defendant.47 To emphasize the intense psychological strain necessary to compromise the
standard of complete disinterestedness, the Supreme Court quoted these insults at length
before quickly concluding that due process required that subsequent criminal contempt
proceedings be conducted by a different judge.48 The Justices conceded that a trial judge
“vilified as was this Pennsylvania judge, necessarily becomes embroiled in a running,
bitter controversy.”49 Teetering here on the edge of realism, the Court quickly pulled
back by concluding that the insulted judge was unlikely to “maintain that calm
detachment necessary for fair adjudication.”50 To say that the judge failed to meet a
standard of calm detachment is kind but understated. To think that the judge was
anything less than furious is inconsistent with human nature, as well as with the fact that,
in the contempt hearing, he had imposed on the defendant a prison term of eleven to
40

Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532.
Id.
42
Id.
43
349 U.S. 133 (1955).
44
Id. at 136.
45
Id. at 136–37.
46
400 U.S. 455 (1971).
47
Id. at 466. The defendant, representing himself at trial, called the judge a “dirty sonofabitch,” “fool,” and
“dirty tyrannical old dog.” Id. He also accused the judge of “running a Spanish Inquisition,” and told him to
“keep your mouth shut” and “go to hell.” Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 465.
50
Id.
41
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twenty-two years for his insults.51 Moreover, despite acknowledging that the defendant’s
conduct would come “as a shock to those raised in the Western tradition that considers a
courtroom a hallowed place . . . ,”52 the Court ended its opinion with the happy thought
that a different judge sitting in a contempt hearing would have “the impersonal authority
of the law . . . .”53 By any realistic assessment, the norms of calm detachment and
complete disinterestedness might, of course, be compromised in a contempt proceeding
presided over by a professional associate of the vilified trial judge. Indeed, these norms
might be compromised every day in normal courtrooms as judges, including the Justices
themselves, find attorneys offensive, unresponsive, unprepared, irritating, or infuriating.
Thus even in a case like Caperton where the Court slightly expanded the standard
for a finding of unconstitutional partiality, it repeatedly asserted an unrealistic and selfserving description of the capacities of ordinary judges. Paradoxically, this idealistic
depiction is an explicit formulation of the same claim that is made implicitly by the ritual
of silence. In different ways, both say: Judges are normally capable of an extremely high
degree of impartiality. It may not be not surprising that the Justices, even when they
choose to acknowledge the possibility of partiality, insist on an idealized depiction of
judges, but it is a fact worth keeping in mind when evaluating the possibility of routine
discussion of the Justices’ interests in cases before them.
B. The Possibility of Bias Arising from Intimidating Speech Directed at a Judge
On occasion the Court also breaks the ritual of silence when the issue it confronts is
the effect on a jurist of threatening speech. Here again the Justices portray judges as
strong and self-disciplined. Before describing the most colorful of these cases, however,
it is necessary to dispel the understandable objection that free speech decisions generally
place a heavy burden on the audience, even when the audience consists of ordinary
citizens rather than judges.
It is true that modern free speech decisions often require ordinary people to put up
with dangerous or offensive speech. To take a famous example, after painting a picture of
the American framers as heroically brave and tolerant, Justice Brandeis argued: “To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practiced . . . . [And] that the danger apprehended is
imminent.”54 Under this rule, people must tolerate risks if the threatened harm is
uncertain or less than serious. And if the threatened harm is both likely and serious, its
occurrence must be imminent. Many cases deny that the protection of citizens’
sensibilities is adequate to justify restrictions on speech even when the harm is certain
and immediate.55 Nevertheless, despite Brandeis’s encomium to the courage of the
founders, by and large the Court’s free speech decisions do not rest on unrealistic
assumptions about the human capacity to tolerate risk, unpleasantness, and disagreement.
Indeed, the modern Court’s vigorous campaign to protect speech rests on pessimistic
assumptions about these aspects of human nature.56 The underlying idea is certainly not
51
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that people are too strong to be hurt by unfettered speech. Even when forbidding a state
from punishing the display of a shocking profanity in a public place, the Justices knew—
and indeed recommended—that passersby would seek to protect themselves by averting
their eyes.57
When Justice Brandeis’s austere standard for protecting potentially harmful speech
was adopted as authoritative in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court used it to set aside the
conviction of a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group for burning a cross at a rally where there
were guns and talk of “some revengence [sic] [being] taken.”58 These actions had been
alleged to violate a prohibition against “advocat[ing] the duty, necessity, or propriety of
crime, . . . violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing . . . political reform.”59 It might be thought that the Court’s insistence that
this statute be restricted to prohibitions against incitement of imminent lawless action
rather cruelly required African-Americans in the vicinity of the rally to abide an
oppressive and threatening atmosphere. It is now fairly clear that this supposition about
the psychological effects of the Court’s holding is accurate. Even if a Ku Klux Klan
leader in the circumstances of Brandenburg were to be tried under a statute prohibiting
cross burning with intent to intimidate, his actions would be protected speech.60 AfricanAmericans must live with the anxiety that comes from knowing that the Ku Klux Klan
meets to burn crosses in the night.61
This, however, does not mean that the Court is insensitive to the psychological
harm created by cross burning. The practice, says the Court in Virginia v. Black, may be
declared to be a species of “true threat” and outlawed, at least when the cross burning is
done with the intent to intimidate a person or specific group of persons.62 It is not
necessary that the speaker intend to make good on the threat because “a prohibition on
true threats protects individuals from the fear of violence and the disruption that fear
engenders, as well as from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”63 The
Court’s position may or may not show sufficient appreciation for the harm done by cross
burning,64 but the majority opinion at least acknowledges that threats are harmful because
they engender fear and fear affects behavior.
Indeed, the Justices are capable of realistic, even sympathetic, accounts of the
psychological damage that unregulated speech can cause. In Hill v. Colorado, for
example, the Court described in these terms the state’s purposes in imposing an eight-foot
buffer zone between those entering a health care facility on public sidewalks and those
who would engage “in oral protest, education, and counseling”:
[T]he statute’s restriction seeks to protect those who enter a health care
facility from the harassment, the nuisance, the persistent importuning, the
following, the dogging, and the implied threat of physical touching that
can accompany an unwelcome approach . . . by a person wishing to argue
57
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vociferously face-to-face and perhaps thrust an undesired handbill upon
her.65
Four concurring Justices added that the protected individuals are “already tense or
distressed in anticipation of medical attention.”66 It should be noted that, according to the
majority, “the implied threat of physical touching” was one of the considerations
important enough to justify the government’s restraints on speech.67
The same degree of empathetic realism cannot be found when the intimidation is
directed at a judge. In Bridges v. California, the Court set aside contempt citations issued
for the asserted purpose of providing fair trials “free from coercion or intimidation” or, as
the Court also phrased it, “to preserve judicial impartiality.”68 One citation had been
directed at a newspaper for publishing an editorial urging a trial judge to sentence two
defendants to prison rather than probation on charges of assault during a labor dispute.69
The editorial cryptically asserted, “Judge A. A. Scott will make a serious mistake if he
grants probation to Matthew Shannon and Kennan Holmes” (whom the editorial had
previously described as “gorillas”).70 The Court declared that these words had no
“inherent tendency” or “reasonable tendency” to compromise the judge’s impartiality
because “it is inconceivable that any judge in Los Angeles would expect anything but
adverse criticism from [the newspaper] in the event probation were granted.”71 Even
giving the editorial “the most intimidating construction it will bear,” to think that it might
influence the judge’s sentencing decision “would be to impute to judges a lack of
firmness, wisdom, or honor . . . .”72
It was left to three dissenters to specify the most intimidating construction that the
editorial could bear. “A powerful newspaper,” wrote Justice Frankfurter, “admonished a
judge, who within a year would have to secure popular approval if he desired continuance
in office, that failure to comply with its demands would be ‘a serious mistake.’”73 Thus
the majority’s position was that the threat of heated opposition from the Los Angeles
Times during a retention campaign would not have an inherent tendency to influence a
sentencing decision. Even Caperton, as unrealistic as that opinion was in the end,
recognized that major factors in a political campaign can in some circumstances be
reasonably thought to threaten judicial impartiality.74
The second contempt citation set aside in Bridges involved a threat by an officer of
the C.I.O. union to respond to an attempt to enforce a judge’s order in a labor dispute by
using strikes to shut down ports in “the entire Pacific Coast.”75 The Court again reasoned
that the judge involved would have known that a strike was possible even without the
explicit threat. The majority therefore concluded, “[W]e find exaggeration in the
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conclusion that the utterance even ‘tended’ to interfere with Justice.”76 Passing the
obvious difference between knowing a strike is possible and knowing that one has been
threatened, the Court’s position presumes that a judge “of reasonable fortitude” (to use
the Court’s words) would not even tend to be influenced by the possibility that his actions
might lead to the closing of traffic in and out of West Coast ports.77
An African-American put in fear for his life by the burning of a cross is, as the
Court has emphasized, reacting to a single act made significant by a long and painful
history. One would think that a judge might—in assessing a strike threat by a union
official—take into account the tumultuous history of labor unrest. A woman, the Justices
have said, can be put in serious distress because of the threat of physical touching implied
by the approach of a protestor. But a judge of reasonable fortitude, according to the
Court, would feel no anxiety at the prospect of precipitating an economic crisis. It is true
that ordinary human beings do not have the official duties that judges have. Nor are their
feelings disciplined by professional expectations and ideals. Nevertheless, the
psychological realism found in many free speech cases is starkly absent when it is a judge
who is the object of intimidating messages. The judge as imagined by the Court in
Bridges is hardly a person at all.
III. EMOTIONALITY AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE JUSTICES’ SENSE OF HEROISM
When the Court is asked to overrule a prior decision, the underlying issue, of
course, is whether its legal analysis in an earlier case was deeply enough mistaken that it
should be abandoned. This is to say that the Court’s own past behavior is the subject
matter of the case. Thus a challenge to stare decisis can implicate the professional skill
and wisdom of the Justices personally if they participated in the case being challenged. It
implicates them in a more remote sense when close colleagues, with whom they work on
the high court, participated in the earlier case. And in any event in such cases the Justices
always have a strong interest in the consequences of their decision because the Court’s
prestige and authority will be affected by admitting serious error.
Therefore, powerful incentives exist for the Justices to deny or minimize prior
error. And even in constitutional cases, where uncorrected mistakes in interpretation
subordinate the fundamental law to the common law norm of following precedent, the
Justices are reluctant to overrule prior decisions. When mistakes are corrected, various
devices are often used to protect the prestige and authority of the Court. When Brown v.
Board of Education effectively overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court famously
emphasized changes in social conditions and in psychological understandings during the
intervening years.78 The severe criticisms of the reasoning in Plessy that were readily
available are omitted, as is any recognition of the unfortunate social consequences of that
decision.79 Brown also illustrates the common technique of emphasizing intervening
cases where the Court has ruled in ways that undermine the original, offending decision.
At the extreme, the mistaken decision can be made to look like a slight aberration from a
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massive and generally correct judicial record.80 Even in cases where prior error is bluntly
and fully acknowledged, face-saving techniques can be found. In Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,81 for instance, Justice Blackmun wrote a full-bore
repudiation of state sovereignty that had been developed in National League of Cities v.
Usery,82 a decision in which he had concurred. Toward the end of this demolition,
Blackmun, quoting from his opinion in National League of Cities, noted that “the fifth
vote” in that case “was ‘not untroubled by certain possible implications of the
decision.’”83
No case better illustrates how intense and personal the Justices’ interests can be in
stare decisis cases than Planned Parenthood v. Casey.84 The United States Justice
Department made Casey the occasion for asking the Court to overrule one of the two
most controversial, divisive, and significant decisions of the twentieth century. Sitting on
the Court at the time were three members who had participated in deciding Roe v.
Wade.85 Over the ensuing years the other six members had, of course, helped to decide
various cases that tested the meaning and limits of Roe.86 When considering the Justices’
personal stake in Casey—whether in favor of reaffirming or overruling Roe—it is
necessary to recall some well-known facts. Roe had invalidated abortions laws in fortysix states. In each year following that decision well over a million abortions have been
performed.87 The Justice Department’s call to overrule Roe v. Wade followed decades of
political resistance to that decision, resistance that took the form of demonstrations and
occasional violence, federal statutes limiting funding for abortions, and dozens of state
statutes that directly or indirectly challenged Roe. Several presidential nominations to the
Court were almost certainly aimed at inducing a reversal of Roe, and one—that of Robert
Bork—resulted in the most vitriolic and dramatic hearings in modern times. In addition to
creating an angry, energetic political movement with wide political impact, Roe had
precipitated intellectual critiques remarkable for their severity and seriousness.88 In short,
the Justices’ positions in Casey would affect their personal and professional relationships,
their reputations, the status of the Court on which they served, the political and cultural
climate of the nation in which they lived, and (it is not too much to say) their places in
history.
The tone and content of the Casey opinion are, to say the least, unusual. The
Justices’ words are weighty and expressive. I cannot think of a case where the Court
makes a more extensive, even impassioned, effort to confront the personal and
institutional implications of a decision. Even while voting to reaffirm the basic holding of
Roe, some of the Justices acknowledge the existence of good-faith doubts about the
80
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morality of abortion,89 as well as their own doubts about its constitutionally protected
status.90 They discuss their reactions to the political turmoil that followed Roe. They
speak openly and proudly of some of the sweeping changes induced in U.S. society by
the Court’s decision.91 And they write at length about the Court’s central role in the U.S.
political system and how that role would be undermined by a decision to overrule Roe v.
Wade.92
If Casey is in many ways a stunning exception to the ritual of silence, it is also a
disturbing reminder of the temptations the Justices face when they drop the mantle of
impersonality. The temptation to minimize or deny past error is pervasive in the majority
opinion. The substantive section of Casey begins with a reformulation of Roe’s account
of why abortion is a protected liberty under the Due Process Clause. Given the depth of
the criticisms that had been leveled at Roe, the reformulation is remarkably brief,
assertive, self-important, and complacent.93 This defense of the central holding in Roe is
followed by a separate and much longer, more systematic discussion of stare decisis.94
Since it is axiomatic that a prior case should not be overruled if it is correct as a matter of
law, the section on stare decisis would not have been necessary if the Justices had been
convinced by their own claims about why Roe had been rightly decided.95 So, the
manifest purpose of the Court’s lengthy and impassioned section on stare decisis was to
provide practical reasons for reaffirming Roe and thereby to diminish the importance of
the question of prior error.
Indeed, the section on stare decisis begins by largely eliminating the question
whether Roe was so wrong that it should be reversed. While recognizing in the abstract
that a prior judicial ruling could come to be seen “clearly as error,” the opinion moves
quickly to assert that “when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations . . . .”96
These considerations—the effects of reversal on the rule of law and the relative costs of
reaffirming and overruling—occupy almost all of the remainder of the long discussion of
stare decisis.
This is not to say that the possibility of error is completely ignored. The Justices
acknowledge it in a few places—but usually dismissively. Thus, the Court describes a
reversal based on a change in the Court’s conception of constitutional principles97 as “a
present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973.”98 What is
needed is “some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly
decided.”99 Thus, the Court treats most principled objections to Roe as momentary
opinions or mere beliefs. At one point the opinion does acknowledge the possibility of a
reversal based on “principles worthy of profound respect” but asserts that such a reversal,
89
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like a reversal based on more superficial ideas, would create an impression in the public
that the Court was surrendering “to political pressure.”100 In contrast, attention to social
facts and pragmatic issues would somehow reinforce the Court’s status as a legal arbiter.
Thus is the possibility of legal error—“if error there was”—pushed to margins of the
case.101
Closely connected to the understandable desire to minimize the possibility that Roe
was based on legal error is the desire to deny that Roe had involved judges in issues that
cannot be resolved by normal judicial methods. The Court dismisses this criticism in one
short paragraph that begins with the bald assertion that Roe “has in no sense proven
‘unworkable.’”102 A few lines later the Justices conclude that the determinations required
by Roe “fall within judicial competence.”103 As an assessment of their own decision
making abilities, this sentence, offered without examples or elaboration, can only be
described as an astonishing expression of self-confidence.
To gauge the scale of this self-confidence, put aside (as, perhaps, too picky) the fact
that in Casey itself the Court abandons as unworkable Roe’s famous trimester scheme.
Consider instead the fact that just a few pages before asserting that the issues raised by
Roe are all within judicial competence, the Court had characterized the inquiry into the
content of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause in this way: “choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy . . . are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”104 It is difficult
to find words to describe the self-confidence of jurists who believe it to be self-evident
that they are competent to decide which liberties are necessary for individuals to define
their own concept of existence and the universe.
But the self-confidence of the Justices does not end there. Prior to Casey and then
in Casey itself, the Justices made determinations about the importance of a state’s interest
in assuring that parents be notified of a daughter’s impending abortion or that husbands
be notified of their wives’ impending abortions.105 In Roe and then again in Casey the
Justices announced their determination that the state’s interest in protecting the potential
life of the fetus becomes significant at the point at which the fetus can live outside the
womb with or without artificial aids. In short, in 1973 the Court plunged into a morass of
the most difficult moral and philosophical issues imaginable. That the Justices could
emerge some twenty years later to announce blandly that these issues are all within their
competence as judges is, to put it mildly, not a sign of any capacity for healthy selfassessment.
In other ways, as well, the Casey opinion merges traditional judicial selfconfidence with hubris. Against the backdrop of the multiple and complex causes of the
radical alterations in sexual mores, employment practices, and family life seen during the
modern era, the Court attributes to Roe the way people have “organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in
100
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society.”106 If a single assertion, this claim might be ignored or explained away. But a bit
later the Justices repeat the thought: “An entire generation has come of age free to
assume Roe’s concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in
society . . . .”107
And hubris merges with grandiosity. In defending Roe v. Wade—possibly the most
incoherent, unmoored decision ever handed down108—the Justices solemnly declare:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to
accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded
truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures
having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is
obliged to make.109
Indeed. And what principle was expressed in Roe? The Casey majority explains that Roe
was one of those cases where the Court “calls the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution.”110 But even this unembarrassed conception of the Court’s role is not
enough. In words often quoted but not fully appreciated, the Justices go on to claim that
the desire of the American people to live according to the rule of law “is not readily
separable from their understanding of the Court vested with the authority . . . to speak
before all others for their constitutional ideals.”111
These ideas—that it is the Court’s role to end national division on deep moral
disputes and to enable Americans to see themselves through constitutional ideals, as well
as the associated idea that overruling Roe v. Wade would undermine the Court’s
legitimacy and thus its capacity to perform these functions—would be less disturbing if
less a reflection of the Justices’ own beliefs and fears. There are, of course, many
empirical studies of the effectiveness of constitutional rulings and the sources of the
Court’s legitimacy.112 But these are not mentioned, perhaps because they tend to show
how murky the social science data is. The entire force of the argument depends on the
Justices’ urgent declarations, and these declarations reveal how completely the Supreme
Court is involved in the case.
Nevertheless, as we have seen in other cases, the Justices claim the mantle of
detachment and selflessness. In at least two places unidentified Justices express personal
reluctance at reaffirming Roe and present themselves as being driven to do so by fine
legal calculations.113 Overruling Roe would also amount to a breach of faith with those
who had accepted that ruling and had suffered as a result. “To all those . . . , the Court
106
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implicitly undertakes to remain steadfast . . . .”114 A willing breach of this “promise of
constancy” would be “nothing less than a breach of faith.”115 While some might detect in
this rather inflated phrasing the suggestion of personal considerations like gratitude and
personal loyalty, the Justices insist their concern is about the Court’s legitimacy, and
legitimacy “is not for the sake of the Court but for the sake of the Nation to which it is
responsible.”116
In Casey the Justices unburden themselves of a self-serving, even grandiose selfimage as well as deep fears and resentments. They nevertheless attempt to present
themselves as impartial arbiters of the law. The members of the majority are so involved
in the case that their writing is close to being unhinged both rhetorically and
substantively.117 Casey may well be the most personal and revealing Supreme Court
decision ever issued. Its excesses, unusual as they may be, must give pause to anyone
proposing that the Justices more openly consider their own frailties and biases.
IV. THE INESCAPABLE SELF-INTEREST OF THE JUSTICES AS A LIMIT ON SELF-EXAMINATION
Chief Justice Rehnquist once broke the ritual of silence to explain why he should
not recuse himself from a case involving an issue that, as a Justice Department attorney,
he had once testified about to Congress.118 His memorandum is a model of lawyerly
analysis—careful, methodical, precise, and respectful. Towards the end of the
memorandum, Rehnquist reaches the question whether, as a discretionary matter, he
should recuse himself because of his previous public statements. He concedes that the
question is “fairly debatable” because the statements indicate a propensity for him to
decide the pending case in a certain way.119 He would not be “start[ing] off from dead
center in . . . willingness or ability to reconcile the opposing arguments . . . with
the . . . law.”120 Although Rehnquist does point out that it is to be expected that judges
will have opinions about issues in cases, he says nothing about why the particular
opinions he expressed did not unduly prejudice him. Instead he turns to the institutional
damage to the Court that would be done if the Justices did not feel “a duty to sit.”121
Taken as a whole, this rather admirable opinion makes its argument by performance; that
is, Rehnquist in effect argues that he can be impartial by demonstrating his intellectual
discipline even while evaluating a charge of bias against him. In holding the balance in
the recusal memorandum (to use the language quoted in Caperton) “nice, clear, and true,”
Rehnquist is not reflecting on his own partiality. Even while addressing the issue of bias,
he is doing what the ritual of silence is intended to do. He is showcasing legalistic virtues
to make personal reflection about the extent of his bias unnecessary.
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Justice Scalia also broke the ritual of silence in a recusal memorandum that
explained why he should not recuse himself after going duck hunting with a party (Vice
President Cheney) to a case before the Court.122 In contrast to Rehnquist’s memorandum,
Scalia’s is highly personal and emotional, in places even bitter. Rehnquist’s discussion is
self-assured in its calm reliance on the capacity to weigh the relevant legal considerations
with precision. Scalia’s is self-assured in its open expression of anger and moral urgency.
Unlike Rehnquist, Scalia gives a specific, rather full account of the events allegedly
giving rise to bias.123 He does not remember, for instance, being alone with the Vice
President.124 He did not save “a cent” by flying to the event on Air Force Two.125 And so
on. In response to the argument that disapproving editorials were sufficient to
demonstrate the appearance of bias, Scalia characterizes the publicity as “a blast of
largely inaccurate and uninformed opinion.”126 He gives no quarter to the legal claims
made for recusal. One argument “would be utterly disabling,”127 another asks “judges to
do precisely what they should not do,”128 and a third has “implications . . . [that are]
staggering.”129 And in the end Justice Scalia casts himself as heroic. He has been the
object of “embarrassing criticism” and cruel observations.130 He “would have been
pleased . . . to silence the criticism, by getting off the case.”131 But the Justice could not
take that easy route because he is bound by law, according to which “there is no basis for
recusal.”132
By now it should be clear that it is no coincidence that these two efforts to evaluate
and explain a Justice’s own impartiality should be characterized either by sterile and
unrealistic appeals to judicial imperviousness or by fulsome and aggressive images of
judicial heroism. These are the same basic strategies that we have seen employed in other
cases where the issue of judicial impartiality is addressed. The bedrock fact is that judges
have an interest in how they speak about whether they are interested. Whether idealized
as a rigorous legal thinker or as a besieged hero, self-interest demands that a Justice
present himself or herself as a person fit to be judge. In our system that leaves two
models from which to draw, the first, more formalistic model requires steely
impersonality and precision. The second, more realistic model requires vigorous selfconfidence. In the rare instances where, for one reason or another, Justices feel the need
to address the issue of judicial partiality, they choose one model or the other.
The great mass of cases, where the Justices treat the issue of partiality as if it did
not exist, are also a response to the two available jurisprudential traditions. The appeal to
realistic considerations to decide the merits of the case threatens to lay bare the Justice’s
political, institutional, and personal interests, while the simultaneous appeal to traditional
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legal norms requires that these interests not be present. The ritual of silence submerges
the issue of partiality and allows the Justices, who are openly dealing with moral and
political matters, to speak as if they were dealing impersonally and admirably only with
legal issues.
It must be said that the exceptional instances of self-examination discussed in this
Essay are discouraging. The two available strategies are dismaying because they reveal
the opposite of what self-examination is meant to reveal. They reveal that the Justices
cannot escape their self-interest by examining it. Better, it might be thought, to leave the
subject of partiality alone unless it simply cannot be avoided.
The ritual of silence, however, is dismaying in its own way. It provides no
assurance to the public that the Justices are even aware of their many interests in the
cases before them. It might be that some passing acknowledgement of the more important
of these interests, if such acknowledgement became an unexceptional part of judicial
practice, could usefully address this problem.133 However, to expect perceptive and
realistic self-assessments would be, it appears, asking too much.

133

For a different, more elaborate, but also moderate proposal, see Frost, supra note 10, at 582–92.
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